Preference aggregation in a multiagent setting is a central issue in both human and computer contexts. In this paper, we study in terms of complexity the vulnerability of preference aggregation to destructive control. That is, we study the ability of an election's chair to, through such mechanisms as voter/candidate addition/suppression/partition, ensure that a particular candidate (equivalently, alternative) does not win. And we study the extent to which election systems can make it impossible, or computationally costly (NP-complete), for the chair to execute such control. Among the systems we study-plurality, Condorcet, and approval voting-we find cases where systems immune or computationally resistant to a chair choosing the winner nonetheless are vulnerable to the chair blocking a victory. Beyond that, we see that among our studied systems no one system offers the best protection against destructive control. Rather, the choice of a preference aggregation system will depend closely on which types of control one wishes to be protected against. We also find concrete cases where the complexity of or susceptibility to control varies dramatically based on the choice among natural tie-handling rules.
Introduction
Voting systems provide a broad model for aggregating preferences in a multiagent setting. The literature on voting is vast and active, and spans such areas as AI, complexity, economics, operations research, and political science. As noted by Conitzer, Lang, and Sandholm [CLS03] , voting has been proposed as a mechanism for use in decision-making in various computational settings, including planning [ER91, ER93] and collaborative filtering [PHG00] . Voting also may be useful in many largescale computer settings. Examples of much recent interest include the (web-page) rank aggregation problem, and related issues of reducing "spam" results in web search and improving similarity search, for which the use of voting systems has been proposed [DKNS01, FKS03] . In such an automated setting, it is natural to imagine decisions with thousands or millions of "voters" and "candidates."
In Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick's seminal paper "How hard is it to control an election?" [BTT92] , the issue of constructive control of election systems is studied: How hard is it for a chair (who knows all voters' preferences) to-through control of the voter or candidate set or of the partition structure of an election-cause a given candidate (equivalently, alternative) to be the (unique) winner?
1 Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick studied plurality and Condorcet voting, and seven natural types of control: adding candidates, suppressing candidates, partition of candidates, run-off partition of candidates, adding voters, suppressing voters, and partition of voters. They found that in some cases there is immunity to constructive control (if his/her candidate was not already the 2 unique winner, no action of the specified type by the chair can make the candidate the unique winner), in some cases there is (computational) resistance to constructive control (it is NP-complete to decide whether the chair can achieve his/her desired outcome), and in some cases the system is (computationally) vulnerable to constructive control (there is a polynomial-time algorithm that will tell the chair how to achieve the desired outcome whenever possible 3 ). In this paper, we obtain results for each of their 14 cases (two preference aggregation systems, each under seven control schemes) in the setting of destructive control. In contrast with constructive control, in which a chair tries to ensure that a specified desirable candidate is the (unique) winner, in destructive control the chair tries to ensure that a specified detested candidate is not the (unique) winner. Regarding the naturalness of destructivity, the light-hearted title of this paper tries to reflect the fact that, in human terms, one often hears feelings expressed that focus strategically on precluding one candidate, and of course in other settings this also may be a goal. Regarding the reality of electoral control, from targeted "get-out-the-vote" advertisements of parties and candidates to (alleged) voter suppression efforts by independent groups, from the way a committee chair groups alternatives to any case where a faculty member hands out student course evaluations on a day some malcontent students are not in class, it is hard to doubt that the desire for electoral control-both destructive and constructive-is a real one.
Destruction has been previously studied by Conitzer, Lang, and Sandholm [CS02, CLS03] , but in the setting of election manipulation-in which some (coalition of) voters knowing all other voters' preferences are free to shift their own preferences to affect the outcome. In contrast, in this paper we 1 In their model, which is also adopted here, the chair has complete information on the voters' preferences. This is a natural assumption in many situations. For example, in a computer science department, after endless discussions, most people know what each person's position is on key issues. Also, since the case where complete information is available to the chair is a special subcase of the more general setting that allows information to be specified with any level of completeness, lower bounds obtained in the complete information setting are inherited by any natural incomplete information model.
2 Really "a unique winner," since there may be no winner at all, but we'll usually write "the unique winner" when this is clear from context. [BTT92] . Key: I = immune, R = resistant, V = vulnerable, TE = Ties-Eliminate, TP = Ties-Promote. study destruction in the very different setting of electoral control [BTT92] -where a chair, given fixed and unchangeable voter preferences, tries to influence the outcome via procedural/access means. One might ask, "Why bother studying destructive control, since any rational chair would prefer to assert constructive control?" The answer is that it is plausible-and our results show it is indeed the case-that destructive control may be possible in settings in which constructive control is not. Informally put, destructive control may be easier for the chair to assert. For example, we prove formally that of the seven types of constructive control of Condorcet elections that Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] study, the four they showed not vulnerable to constructive control are all vulnerable to destructive control. The remaining three cases regarding Condorcet voting are vulnerable to constructive control [BTT92] , but we show that they are immune to destructive control.
4
Table 1 summarizes our results on the complexity of destructively controlling Condorcet, plurality, and approval elections. We also when needed obtain, for comparative purposes, new results on the complexity of constructive control, and Table 1 displays those and also constructive control results of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] . All entries in boldface in Table 1 are new results obtained in this paper; the other results are due to Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] . For each boldface "V" in the table, "certifiably-vulnerable" is in fact also achieved by our theorems. We men-4 Savvy readers may wonder whether there is something very troubling in having a system be vulnerable to constructive control but immune to destructive control. After all, to ensure that the despised candidate c is not the unique winner we simply have to ask whether either at least one of the other candidates can be ensured to unique-win-or-tiefor-winner or it can be ensured that there are no winners. Put somewhat formally, this implies that for strongly voiced (i.e., systems for which whenever there is at least one candidate there will be at least one winner) election systemsthough of course Condorcet voting is not strongly voiced and so this is not an issue for the three cases mentioned in the main text-destructive control polynomial-time disjunctively truth-table reduces [LLS75] to constructive control (redefined to speak not of "unique winner" but to speak of "winner (possibly with others also winning)"), and so the destructive control problem can (within a polynomial factor) be no harder computationally than the (redefined) constructive control problem (this reduction is noted in a different setting by Conitzer and Sandholm [CS02] ). Our brief explanation of why cases of such a form would not cause a paradox lies in the word "computational": Although immunity is the most desirable case in terms of security from control, the complexity of recognizing whether a given candidate can be precluded from winning in immune cases will most typically be in P-after all, we can never, when immunity holds, change a given candidate from unique winner to not the unique winner, so the related decision problem is typically easy. (Technical side remark: We say "will most typically be in P/is typically" rather than "will be in P/is" because for impractical systems that-unlike those here-have winner-testing problems that are not in P, it is in concept possible that one can have immunity and yet also have the related language problem not belong to P.)
The disjunctive-truth-table connection mentioned above explains why, if P = NP, it is impossible for any strongly voiced election system to have computational resistance to destructive control hold for any problem that, when redefined to embrace ties, is vulnerable to constructive control. tion in passing that for nonboldface "V"s in the table, "certifiably-vulnerable" can be seen directly from or by modifying the algorithms of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] .
For control-by-partition problems-which will involve subelection(s)-we distinguish between the models Ties-Eliminate (TE, for short) and Ties-Promote (TP, for short), which define what happens when there are ties among winners in a subelection (before the final election), namely, all participating candidates are eliminated (TE), or all who tie for winner move forward (TP). Note that these models do not apply to Condorcet voting, under which when a winner exists s/he is inherently unique; so the TE/TP distinction is made only for plurality and approval voting.
The natural conclusion to draw from our results is that when selecting an election/preference aggregation system, one should at least be aware of the issue of the system's vulnerability to controland, beyond that, one's choice of system will depend closely on which types of immunity or computational resistance one most values. Our results also show that constructive and destructive control often differ greatly: A system immune to constructive control may be vulnerable to destructive control, and vice versa. Finally, our results show-in contrast with some comments in earlier papers-that breaking ties is far from a minor issue: For both voting types where tie-handling rules are meaningful, we find cases where the complexity of or susceptibility to control varies dramatically based on the choice among natural tie-handling rules.
Preliminaries
We first define the three voting systems considered. In approval voting, each voter votes "Yes" or "No" for each candidate. (So, for approval voting, a voter's preferences are reflected by a 0-1 vector.) All candidates with the maximum number of "Yes" votes are winners. Approval voting has been proposed as a variant of plurality voting, see Brams and Fishburn [BF83] .
Plurality and Condorcet voting are defined in terms of strict preferences. For them, an election is given by a preference profile, a pair (C, V ) such that C is a set of candidates and V is the multiset (henceforth, we'll just say set, as a shorthand) of the voters' preference orders on C. 5 We assume that the preference orders are irreflexive and antisymmetric (i.e., every voter has strict preferences over the candidates), complete (i.e., every voter ranks each candidate), and transitive.
A voting system is a rule for how to determine the winner(s) of an election. Formally, any voting system is defined to be a (social choice) function mapping any given preference profile (or the analog with voters' 0-1 vectors for the approval voting case) to society's aggregate choice set, the set of candidates who have won the election.
In plurality voting, each candidate with a maximum number of "first preference among the candidates in the election" voters for him/her wins. In Condorcet voting, for each c ∈ C, c is a winner if and only if for each d ∈ C with d = c, c defeats d by a strict majority of votes in a pairwise election between them based on the voters' preferences.
The Condorcet Paradox observes that whenever there are at least three candidates, due to cyclic aggregate preference rankings Condorcet winners may not exist [Con85] . That is, the set of winners may be empty. However, a Condorcet winner is unique whenever one does exist. In the case of plurality and approval voting, due to ties, there may exist multiple winners. Regarding ties, we-following Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] to best allow comparison-focus in our control problems on creating a unique winner (constructive), and precluding a candidate from being the unique winner (destructive). (Ties in subelections, for the partition problems, are handled via the TE and TP rules described earlier.)
Results
The issue of control of an election by the authority conducting it (called the chair) can be studied under a variety of models and scenarios. For plurality and Condorcet voting, Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] -and for the rest of this section that paper will be referred to as "BTT92"-study constructive control by adding candidates, deleting candidates, partition of candidates, run-off partition of candidates, adding voters, deleting voters, and partition of voters. In their setting, the chair's goal is to make a given candidate uniquely win the election. Analogously, we consider in turn the corresponding seven destructive control problems, where the chair's goal is to preclude a given candidate from being the unique winner. For each of these control scenarios, we define the problem and present prior results and our results. (Formally, for each type of control one defines a decision problem and studies its computational complexity.) To make comparisons as easy as possible, we in stating these control problems whenever possible exactly follow BTT92's wording for constructive control (except modified to the destructive case for the destructive cases), and when we diverge, we explain why and how.
Control by Adding Candidates
As is common, we state our decision problems as "Given" instances, and a related Yes/No question. The language in each case is the set of all instances for which the answer is Yes. Since in each control scenario, the "Given" instance is identical for the constructive and the destructive case, we state it just once and then state the corresponding two questions, one for constructive and one for destructive control.
Given: A set C of qualified candidates and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, a set D of possible spoiler candidates, and a set V of voters with preferences (in the approval case, the "preferences" will, as always for that case, actually be 0-1 vectors) over C ∪ D.
Question (constructive):
Is there a choice of candidates from D whose entry into the election would assure that c is the unique winner?
Question (destructive): Is there a choice of candidates from D whose entry into the election would assure that c is not the unique winner?
The above type of control captures the idea that the chair tries to enthrone the desired candidate c (in the constructive case) or to dethrone the despised candidate c (in the destructive case) by introducing new "spoiler" candidates.
V is formally a multiset. However, throughout this paper we assume-as is the standard approach in papers on the computational complexity of elections-that in the input the preferences are coded as a list (the ballots), one voter at a time, and in particular are not encoded as a multiset that uses binary numbers to code cardinalities.
With this first problem-Control by Adding Candidates-stated, now is a good time to define our notions of control. Our terminology will closely follow the notions in BTT92, to allow comparison. So, though Condorcet and approval are immune to constructive control of this sort, they both are vulnerable to destructive control. This reverses itself for:
Control by Deleting Candidates
Given: A set C of candidates, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, a set V of voters, and a positive integer k < ||C||.
Question (constructive):
Is there a set of k or fewer candidates in C whose disqualification would assure that c is the unique winner?
Question (destructive): Is there a set of k or fewer candidates in C − {c} whose disqualification would assure that c is not the unique winner?
In this type of control, the chair seeks to influence the outcome of the election by suppressing certain candidates (other than c), in hopes that their voters now support c to ensure c's victory 6 For the problems studied here, certifiably-vulnerable implies vulnerable (but we list both, since if one studied add/delete problems stated not in terms of "is there some subset" or "by adding/deleting at most k" but rather in terms of "by adding/deleting exactly k," then for certain systems the implication need not hold).
7 It would be more natural to define resistance as meaning the corresponding language is (many-one) NP-hard. However, in this paper, we define resistance in terms of NP-completeness. One reason is that this matches the way the term is used by BTT92. More importantly, all the problems discussed in this paper have obvious NP upper bounds since testing whether a given candidate has won a given election for the systems considered here is obviously in P. So for the problems in this paper, NP-completeness and NP-hardness stand or fall together. We mention in passing that there are natural election systems whose complexity seems beyond NP. The first such case established was for the election system defined by Lewis Carroll in 1876 [Dod76] , where even the complexity of determining whether a given candidate has won is now known to be hard for parallel access to NP [HHR97] . Other election systems whose winner complexity is hard for parallel access to NP include Kemeny and Young elections, see [HH00,SV00,SV01, RSV03,HSV05].
(in the constructive case) or that they now support another candidate to ensure stopping c (in the destructive case). Note that this formalization of the destructive case is not a perfect analog of the constructive case of BTT92 in that we explicitly prevent deleting c, since otherwise any voting system in which the winners can efficiently be determined would be trivially vulnerable to this type of control.
Here We now handle jointly the two types of partition of candidates, since they yield identical results.
Control by Partition of Candidates
Given: A set C of candidates, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, and a set V of voters.
Question (constructive):
Is there a partition of C into C 1 and C 2 such that c is the unique winner in the sequential two-stage election in which the winners in the subelection (C 1 , V ) who survive the tie-handling rule move forward to face the candidates in C 2 (with voter set V )?
Question (destructive): Is there a partition of C into C 1 and C 2 such that c is not the unique winner in the sequential two-stage election in which the winners in the subelection (C 1 , V ) who survive the tie-handling rule move forward to face the candidates in C 2 (with voter set V )?
Control by Run-Off Partition of Candidates Given: A set C of candidates, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, and a set V of voters.
Is there a partition of C into C 1 and C 2 such that c is the unique winner of the election in which those candidates surviving (with respect to the tie-handling rule) subelections (C 1 , V ) and (C 2 , V ) have a run-off with voter set V .
Question (destructive):
Is there a partition of C into C 1 and C 2 such that c is not the unique winner of the election in which those candidates surviving (with respect to the tie-handling rule) subelections (C 1 , V ) and (C 2 , V ) have a run-off with voter set V .
These two types of control express settings-one via a cascading setup, and one via a run-off setup-in which the chair tries to, overall, partition the candidates in such a clever way that the favored candidate c is made the unique winner (in the constructive case) or that the hated candidate c fails to be the unique winner (in the destructive case). Here, BTT92 shows that for constructive control plurality is resistant (and their result on that holds in both our TE and TP models) and Condorcet is vulnerable. Our results are: So Condorcet, though vulnerable to constructive control, is immune to destructive control here. And, perhaps more interesting, for constructive control, approval changes from vulnerable to immune depending on the tie-handling rule.
We now turn to control of the voter set. The intuition behind seeking destructive control by adding or deleting voters is clear, e.g., getting out the vote and vote suppression. We handle these two cases together as their results are identical.
Control by Adding Voters
Given: A set of candidates C and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, a set V of registered voters, an additional set W of yet unregistered voters (both V and W have preferences over C), and a positive integer k ≤ ||W ||.
Question (constructive):
Is there a set of k or fewer voters from W whose registration would assure that c is the unique winner?
Is there a set of k or fewer voters from W whose registration would assure that c is not the unique winner?
Control by Deleting Voters
Given: A set of candidates C, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, a set V of voters, and a positive integer k ≤ ||V ||.
Question (constructive):
Is there a set of k or fewer voters in V whose disenfranchisement would assure that c is the unique winner?
Question (destructive): Is there a set of k or fewer voters in V whose disenfranchisement would assure that c is not the unique winner?
Here, BTT92 shows that for constructive control plurality is vulnerable and Condorcet is resistant. Our results are:
Theorem 3.5 Approval is resistant to constructive control by adding voters and by deleting voters. Plurality, Condorcet, and approval are all vulnerable/certifiably-vulnerable to destructive control by adding voters and by deleting voters.
So Condorcet and approval, though resistant to constructive control, are vulnerable to destructive control here.
The final problem here results in a surprise.
Control by Partition of Voters
Given: A set of candidates C, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, and a set V of voters.
Question (constructive):
Is there a partition of V into V 1 and V 2 such that c is the unique winner in the hierarchical two-stage election in which the survivors of (C, V 1 ) and (C, V 2 ) run against each other with voter set V ?
Question (destructive): Is there a partition of V into V 1 and V 2 such that c is not the unique winner in the hierarchical two-stage election in which the survivors of (C, V 1 ) and (C, V 2 ) run against each other with voter set V ?
In this last type of control, the voter set is partitioned into two "subcommittees" that both separately select their "nominees," who run against each other in the final decision stage. Unlike BTT92, we again distinguish between the two models Ties-Eliminate and Ties-Promote defined above. That is, in the Ties-Eliminate model, if two or more candidates tie for winning in a subcommittee's election, no candidate is nominated by that subcommittee. In contrast, in the Ties-Promote model, all the candidates who tie for winning in a subcommittee's election are nominated to run in the final decision stage.
We mention that both of our two tie-handling models, TE and TP, differ from the model adopted in BTT92, where they for vulnerability results about this problem adopt a third model in which ties are handled not by a tie-handling rule but rather by changing the decision problem itself to require the chair to find a partition that completely avoids ties in any subcommittee. We find our model the more natural, but for completeness we mention that they obtained for this case, in their tie model, a constructive-control vulnerability result for plurality. For Condorcet and constructive control, BTT92 proves that resistance holds. Our results are:
Theorem 3.6 Approval is resistant to constructive control by partition of voters in models TE and TP, and vulnerable/certifiably-vulnerable to destructive control by partition of voters in models TE and TP. Plurality is vulnerable/certifiably-vulnerable to both constructive and destructive control by partition of voters in model TE, and is resistant to both constructive and destructive control by partition of voters in model TP. Condorcet is vulnerable/certifiably-vulnerable to destructive control by partition of voters.
The most striking behavior here is that plurality voting varies between being vulnerable and being resistant, depending on the tie-handling rule. The loose intuition for this is that in TE, at most one candidate wins each subcommittee and in polynomial time we can explore every way this can happen. In contrast, under TP potentially any subset of candidates may move forward, and in this particular setting, that flexibility is enough to support NP-completeness. Also interesting is that both Condorcet and approval, while resistant to constructive control, are vulnerable to destructive control.
Proofs
In this section, we provide the proofs of the results stated in Section 3. Table 2 presents, for each of the seven control types considered, the corresponding main result from Section 3 as well as the specific theorems, corollaries, and examples from which this main result follows.
We first present the immunity and susceptibility results. Then we present the vulnerability results, and finally we present the resistance results. The proof techniques employed range from political-science-axiom-fueled arguments (for proving immunity), to designing efficient algorithms (for proving vulnerability), to the construction of NP-hardness reductions (for proving resistance). 
Proving Immunity and Susceptibility
For each of the 39 boldfaced entries in Table 1 , this section must establish immunity if the entry is a boldface "I" and must establish susceptibility if the entry is a boldface "R" or a boldface "V." (Recall that the definitions of resistance and vulnerability require susceptibility, and so proving susceptibility is a first step toward proving resistance or vulnerability.)
Links Between Susceptibility Cases
Rather than hand-proving each of the 39 cases just mentioned, it makes sense to extract connections between the cases. We start by stating four easy but useful dualities.
Theorem 4.1 1. A voting system is susceptible to constructive control by adding candidates if and only if it is susceptible to destructive control by deleting candidates.

A voting system is susceptible to constructive control by deleting candidates if and only if it is
susceptible to destructive control by adding candidates.
A voting system is susceptible to constructive control by adding voters if and only if it is susceptible to destructive control by deleting voters.
A voting system is susceptible to constructive control by deleting voters if and only if it is susceptible to destructive control by adding voters.
This theorem is easy to see, and so its proof is omitted. We also have the following four implication results. Proof. We first prove parts 1 and 2. Let (C, V ) be an election and c ∈ C a candidate such that c is not the unique winner of (C, V ) and such that c can be made the unique winner by partition of candidates, run-off partition of candidates, or partition of voters. Fix a partitioned election such that c is the unique winner of this election and let D ⊆ C be the set of candidates that participate in the final round of the partitioned election. Then c is the unique winner of (D, V ). Thus, the voting system is susceptible to constructive control by deleting candidates. For part 3, let (C, V ) be an election and c ∈ C a candidate such that c is not the unique winner of (C, V ) and such that c can be made the unique winner by partition of voters in model TE. Let (V 1 , V 2 ) be a partition of V such that c is the unique winner of the partitioned election. Since c makes it to the final run-off, and since we are in model TE, c is the unique winner of one of (C, V 1 ) and (C, V 2 ). Without loss of generality, suppose c is the unique winner of (C, V 1 ). Thus, the voting system is susceptible to constructive control by deleting voters.
For part 4, let (C, V ) be an election and c ∈ C a candidate such that c is the unique winner of (C, V ) and such that c can be made to be not the unique winner by partition of candidates or run-off partition of candidates. Fix a partitioned election such that c is not the unique winner of this election and let D ⊆ C be the set of candidates that participate in the final round of the partitioned election. If c ∈ D, then c is not the unique winner of (D, V ). If c ∈ D, then c is not the unique winner of the subelection involving c. Thus, the voting system is susceptible to destructive control by deleting candidates. u
Let us say that a voting system is voiced if in any election that has exactly one candidate, that candidate is always a (and thus, the unique) winner. Note that plurality, Condorcet, and approval are all voiced systems. For voiced systems, we have the following three additional results.
Theorem 4.3 1. If a voiced voting system is susceptible to destructive control by partition of voters (in model TE or TP), then it is susceptible to destructive control by deleting voters.
Each voiced voting system is susceptible to constructive control by deleting candidates.
Each voiced voting system is susceptible to destructive control by adding candidates.
Proof. Fix a voiced voting system.
For part 1, suppose that our voting system is immune to destructive control by deleting voters. We will show that it is also immune to destructive control by partition of voters. Let (C, V ) be an election such that c is the unique winner of (C, V ), and let (V 1 , V 2 ) be an arbitrary partition of V . Then c is the unique winner of (C, V 1 ) and of (C, V 2 ), and so c is the only candidate participating in the final run-off (both in model TP and in model TE). Since the voting system is voiced, c wins the final run-off, and is thus the unique winner of the partitioned election. It follows that the voting system is immune to destructive control by partition of voters.
For part 2, let C = {c, d} and let V be an arbitrary set of voters with preferences over C. At least one of the candidates is not a unique winner of (C, V ). Without loss of generality, let c not be a unique winner of (C, V ). Since the voting system is voiced, c is the unique winner of ({c}, V ). It follows that the voting system is susceptible to constructive control by deleting candidates.
Part 3 follows immediately from part 2 of this theorem and part 2 of Theorem 4. 
Immunity Results
We start by proving the immunity results of Theorems 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. These results are generally clear from the definitions. Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] observed 9 that immunity to constructive control by adding candidates follows from the "unique" version of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (denoted by Unique-WARP), which says that a unique winner among a collection of candidates always remains a unique winner among every subcollection of candidates that includes him/her. Theorem 4.6 states ways in which Unique-WARP influences a variety of destructive control scenarios. 
Approval voting is immune to constructive control by adding candidates, and is immune to destructive control by deleting candidates and by partition and run-off partition of candidates (in both the TE and the TP models).
Proof. Both Condorcet and approval voting clearly satisfy Unique-WARP. The result now follows from Theorems 4.5 and 4.6. u
Note that, unlike Condorcet and approval, plurality voting does not satisfy Unique-WARP, and we will see that immunity does not hold for plurality in any control scenario considered here.
We now state and prove the final two immunity results.
Theorem 4.8 Approval voting is immune to constructive control by partition and run-off partition of candidates in model TP.
Proof. It is easy to see that in approval voting, a candidate c is the unique winner if and only if there is a unique candidate with a maximum number of Yes votes and c is that candidate. In the TP model, this remains true even under the two partitioning schemes. u 9 Their paper is somewhat nonspecific regarding the uniqueness issue and merely says WARP.
Susceptibility Results
We now turn to proving susceptibility results for the 28 boldface "R" and boldface "V" boxes in Table 1 . Note that in concept each of the "R" and "V" claims made by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] is asserting a susceptibility result, and around eight of those-via our Section 4.1.1 theorems-imply eight of the 28 susceptibility results that we need. However, Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] generally do not prove their susceptibility claims, and so we will prove susceptibility here for all our 28 cases. Now, how does one prove susceptibility? One need simply give an example in each case. Alternatively, some cases we get indirectly from an earlier example via our Section 4.1.1 theorems. However, please note that even in those cases, there is implicitly a concrete example, as the theorems of Section 4.1.1 have constructive proofs. Also, we mention again that plurality, Condorcet, and approval are all voiced voting systems (in the sense defined in Section 4.1.1).
We first show that plurality is not immune to constructive or destructive control by partition of voters in model TE or to destructive control by deleting voters. 
Thus, c does not win in (C, V ). However, if we partition
V into V 1 = {v 5 } and V 2 = V − V 1 , c
.3, this latter susceptibility claim implies that plurality is susceptible to destructive control by deleting voters (which is another of the 28 boldfaced "R"-or-"V" boxes we are handling).
We now prove that Condorcet voting is susceptible to destructive control by partition of voters and to destructive control by deleting voters. We now prove that approval voting is susceptible to destructive control by partition of voters in models TE and TP, to destructive control by deleting voters, and to constructive control by adding voters.
Example 4.11 Let C = {a, b, c}, and define V to consist of the following ten voters (specified by vectors from {0, 1} 3 , with the first, second, and third bits specifying approval/disapproval for a The following example shows that approval voting is not immune to destructive control by adding voters or to constructive control by deleting voters. We now show susceptibility for approval voting to constructive control by partition of candidates and run-off partition of candidates, both in model TE. Finally, we show that approval voting is susceptible to constructive control by partition of voters in models TE and TP. 
Proving Vulnerability
The certifiably-vulnerable results (which here imply the vulnerable results) range from clear greedy algorithms to trickier algorithms based on characterizing the ways in which a candidate can be made to win (in the constructive case) or can be precluded from winning (in the destructive case). The more surprising of these have to do with the tie-handling cases of partition problems-where the chair can at times do shrewd things (e.g., shift voters counterintuitively to induce ties that kill off stronger candidates).
Partition of Voters
We start with the "control by partition of voters" problems. For plurality voting, we here obtain the same results in the constructive and the destructive case, as stated in Table 1 and in Theorem 3.6. On the other hand, the question of whether resistance or vulnerability holds depends on which tie-handling rule is chosen.
Theorem 4.18 In model TE, plurality voting is vulnerable/certifiably-vulnerable to constructive control by partition of voters.
Proof. By Example 4.9, susceptibility holds.
Given a set of candidates C, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, and a voter set V , we describe a polynomial-time algorithm for this problem. For any partition (V 1 , V 2 ) of the voter set V , let Nominees(C, V i ), i ∈ {1, 2}, denote the set of candidates who are nominated by the subcommittee V i (with candidates C) for the run-off in model TE. To ensure that c is the unique winner, under the desired partition setup, we may without loss of generality focus on the following five cases (Cases 3 and 5 are not necessarily disjoint):
Case 1: Nominees(C, V 1 ) = {c} and Nominees(C, V 2 ) = ∅ due to V 2 = ∅. In Case 1, it clearly suffices to check whether c is an overall plurality winner. Note further that if Case 2 holds for some partition (V 1 , V 2 ), then c must be an overall plurality winner, and thus will also win via the partition (V, ∅). We now argue that the same is true in Case 3. For any candidate i, let score(i) denote the number of voters who rank i first-place in (C, V ). In Case 3, note that for all e ∈ C − {c}, score(e) < score(c), since c has strictly more first-place votes than e in (C, V 1 ) and e at best ties c for first-place votes in (C, V 2 ). It follows that c must already be an overall plurality winner in Case 3, and thus will also win via the partition (V, ∅).
So, our algorithm, after checking whether c is a plurality winner overall (thus catching Cases 1, 2, and 3), will by brute force check whether Case 4 or Case 5 can be made to hold for some partition of the voter set.
Given C, c, and V as above, our polynomial-time algorithm proceeds as follows. If c is a plurality winner of (C, V ), output (V, ∅) as a successful partition and halt; else if ||C|| = 2, then output "control impossible" (which in this context means that making c a unique winner is impossible) and halt. Otherwise, we first try to make Case 4 hold and then, if that fails, try to make Case 5 hold. These two tests are implemented by the two loops described below, and if they both fail, control is not possible. Loop trying to make Case 5 hold: If the loop trying to make Case 4 hold was not successful, then for each d ∈ C and for each e ∈ C such that ||{c, d, e}|| = 3 and score(d) ≤ score(e), do the following: If it holds that, for each f ∈ C − {c},
then output (V 1 , V 2 ) as a successful partition and halt, where V 1 consists of all score(c) voters whose first choice is c, of exactly score(e) − score(d) of the voters whose first choice is e, and for all f ∈ C − {c, d, e}, exactly min(score(f ), score(c) − 1) of the voters whose first choice is f , and where
Otherwise (i.e., if the Case 5 loop was not successful either), c cannot win, so we output "control impossible" and halt. u
We now make a general remark. In various cases, our polynomial-time algorithms have loops. In some cases, these loops can be collapsed or removed. Doing so
• improves the runtime and makes the algorithm look simpler, but
• makes it a bit harder to see that the algorithm is correct.
Since correctness is what we most care about, we do not collapse such loops. But let us explicitly mention the "look" of such collapses. In the proof of Theorem 4.18 above, the "For each d ∈ C, d = c, such that c beats d in a pairwise plurality election by the voters in V , do. . . " loop trying to make Case 4 hold in the algorithm can safely be changed to: "If there exists some ) is maximum. Again, this is just an example, and to have our correctness as unobscured as possible and as our focus is on the gap between P and NP-hard, we in general forgo such optimizations of the precise polynomial of the runtime.
We now turn to the destructive analog of Theorem 4.18.
Theorem 4.19 In model TE, plurality voting is vulnerable/certifiably-vulnerable to destructive control by partition of voters.
Proof. That susceptibility holds in this case has been shown in Example 4.9. Given a set of candidates C, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, and a voter set V , our polynomialtime algorithm for this control problem works as follows. If C = {c}, output "control impossible" and halt, as c must win; else if c already is not the unique plurality winner, output (V, ∅) as a successful partition and halt. Now, we check if every voter's first choice is c or if ||C|| = 2, and if one of these two conditions is true, we output "control impossible" and halt, since c cannot help but win.
Again, let score(i) denote the number of voters who rank candidate i first-place. Let d be a candidate who other than c got the most first-place votes, and let e be a candidate who other than c and d got the most first-place votes. We can certainly dethrone c if
score(c) ≤ score(d) + score(e). (4.1)
Namely, if Equation (4.1) holds, we output (V 1 , V 2 ) as a successful partition and halt, where V 1 consists of all score(d) voters whose first choice is d and exactly score(d) voters whose first choice is c (recall that in the current case we already know that score(c) > score(d)), and where V 2 = V − V 1 . Then c and d will tie for winner in (C, V 1 ), so no one will be nominated by the subcommittee V 1 in model TE, and e will tie or beat c in (C, V 2 ), so c is not nominated by the subcommittee V 2 either.
On the other hand, if Equation (4.1) is not satisfied, we have
so in any partition (V 1 , V 2 ), c clearly will triumph in one of (C, V 1 ) or (C, V 2 ). Thus, we now know it is impossible to make sure that c loses in both subcommittees. If c is nominated by both subcommittees (in model TE), c trivially is the unique winner of the final run-off. So, our algorithm now checks if it is possible for c to win in exactly one subcommittee, and yet can be made to not be the unique winner of the final run-off. For this to happen, it is (given the case we are in) a necessary and sufficient condition that there exists some candidate d such that:
• d ties or beats c in a pairwise plurality election, and
• for each candidate e, c = e = d, we have that score(e) < score(c) + score(d) − 2.
We can in polynomial time brute-force check whether the above three conditions hold for some candidate d, and if they do, let d ′ be some such candidate d and output (V 1 , V 2 ) as a successful partition and halt, where V 1 consists of all score(c) voters whose first choice is c and, for each candidate e with c = e = d ′ , of exactly min(score(c) − 1, score(e)) voters whose first choice is e, and where V 2 = V − V 1 . Finally, if the above two conditions cannot be satisfied for any d, output "control impossible" and halt. u
We now prove that Condorcet voting is vulnerable/certifiably-vulnerable to destructive control by partition of voters.
Theorem 4.20 Condorcet voting is vulnerable/certifiably-vulnerable to destructive control by partition of voters.
Proof. By Example 4.10, susceptibility holds.
Given a set of candidates C, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, and a voter set V , our polynomialtime algorithm for this control problem proceeds in three stages:
1. Checking the trivial cases: If C = {c}, output "control impossible" and halt, as c must win. Otherwise, if c already is not the Condorcet winner, output (V, ∅) as a successful partition and halt. Otherwise, if ||C|| = 2, output "control impossible" and halt, since in this case c is the Condorcet winner, so c is preferred by a strict majority of votes to the other candidate and thus will win at least one subcommittee and also the run-off. 
which is equivalent to 3. Termination: If in no loop iteration did we find an a and b that allowed us to output a partition of voters dethroning c, then output "control impossible" and halt.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.20. u
We now prove that approval voting is vulnerable/certifiably-vulnerable to destructive control by partition of voters in models TE and TP.
Theorem 4.21 Approval voting is vulnerable/certifiably-vulnerable to destructive control by partition of voters in models TE and TP.
Proof. That susceptibility holds in this case is shown by Example 4.11.
We describe two polynomial-time algorithms for these two control problems, one for TE and one for TP. Given a set of candidates C, a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, and a voter set V , both algorithms again proceed in the following three phases:
1. Checking the trivial cases: If C = {c}, output "control impossible" and halt, as c must win. Otherwise, if c already is not the unique winner, output (V, ∅) as a successful partition and halt. Otherwise, if ||C|| = 2, output "control impossible" and halt, since in this case c is the unique winner, so c will win in at least one subcommittee and will also win the run-off.
Loop:
In this phase, if none of the trivial cases applies, we try to find a pair of candidates, a and b, that allows us to determine a successful partition of voters. This phase is described below, separately for TE and TP.
3. Termination: If in no loop iteration did we find an a and b that allowed us to output a partition of voters dethroning c, then output "control impossible" and halt.
The two algorithms differ only in the second phase. To describe one loop iteration for some pair of candidates, a and b, we use the following notation: For each voter in V , we focus just on his/her approval of a, b, and c, represented (in that order) as a vector from {0, 
more Yes votes than c. So, for the construction to work, we must argue that
That is, we need
If W c < S a , Equation (4.5) follows trivially from the fact that 0 ≤ L c + S b . And if W c ≥ S a , Equation (4.5) follows immediately from Equation (4.4).
Loop in model TP: For each a, b ∈ C with ||{a, b, c}|| = 3, we test whether we can make a strictly beat c in (C, V 1 ) and make b strictly beat c in (C, V 2 ) .
If W c − L c > S a + S b − 2 or S a = 0 or S b = 0, then this a and b are hopeless, so move on to consider the next a and b in the loop. Otherwise, we have
and S a > 0 and S b > 0, and output (V 1 , V 2 ) as a successful partition and halt, where V 1 contains all voters contributing to S ac and S a , and also min(W c , S a − 1) voters contributing to W c , and where
In (C, V 1 ), a (strictly) beats c, since a gets 
If W c ≤ S a − 1, Equation (4.7) reduces to 0 < L c + S b , which follows from the fact that in the current case S b > 0. And if W c > S a − 1, Equation (4.7) follows immediately from Equation (4.6). u
Adding and Deleting Voters, Destructive Case
We now turn to proving the vulnerability results for destructive control by adding and by deleting voters for each of plurality, Condorcet, and approval voting. We start with plurality voting.
Theorem 4.22 Plurality voting is vulnerable/certifiably-vulnerable to destructive control both by adding voters and by deleting voters.
Proof. By Examples 4.9 and 4.12, susceptibility holds. In a nutshell, for the adding voters case, we give a "smart greedy" algorithm, and for the deleting voters case, we give a "dumb greedy" algorithm. In both cases, we prove only that plurality voting is certifiably-vulnerable to destructive control, since this implies vulnerability. Recall that no "k" is specified in the corresponding control problems, as in this setting the chair seeks to determine in polynomial time the smallest number of voters needed to be added or deleted to execute control.
In the adding voters case, we are given a set C of candidates, a distinguished candidate c, a set V of registered voters, and an additional set W of as yet unregistered voters (both V and W have preferences over C). If c already is not a unique plurality winner in the election (C, V ), adding no voters accomplishes our goal, and we are done. Otherwise, sort all candidates in C distinct from c by how many votes each needs to tie c. Let d i denote the ith candidate in the ordering thus obtained, and let diff(d i ) denote d i 's deficit of first-place votes needed to tie c. Thus, the order is such that diff(
). For i = 1, 2, . . . , ||C|| − 1, if the number of unregistered voters whose first choice is d i is greater than or equal to diff(d i ), then add diff(d i ) of these unregistered voters to ensure that d i ties c (and c thus is not the unique winner) and halt. If in no iteration of this for-loop was some candidate able to dethrone c, output "control impossible" and halt.
In the deleting voters case, we are given a set C of candidates, a distinguished candidate c, and a set V of voters with preferences over C. If C = {c}, then output "control impossible" and halt; else if c already is not the unique plurality winner in the election (C, V ), deleting no voters accomplishes our goal, and we are done. Now, if every candidate other than c gets zero first-place votes, then output "control impossible" and halt. Otherwise, let d be the candidate closest to c in first-place votes, and let diff(d) denote d's deficit of first-place votes needed to tie c. Then deleting diff(d) voters whose first choice is c assures that c is not the unique winner, and this is the fewest deletions that can achieve that. u
Theorem 4.23 Condorcet voting is vulnerable/certifiably-vulnerable to destructive control both by adding voters and by deleting voters.
Proof. By Examples 4.10 and 4.12, susceptibility holds. We again prove only certifiable vulnerability, since this here implies vulnerability.
In the adding voters case, we are given a set C of candidates, a distinguished candidate c, a set V of registered voters, and an additional set W of as yet unregistered voters (both V and W have preferences over C). If C = {c}, then output "control impossible" and halt; else if c already is not a Condorcet winner in the election (C, V ), adding no candidates accomplishes our goal, and we are done. Otherwise, for each candidate i = c, call i lucky if and only if the surplus of c relative to i (denoted by surplus(c, i), which is defined as the number of registered voters who prefer c to i minus the number of registered voters who prefer i to c) is less than or equal to the number of unregistered voters who prefer i to c. If there is at least one lucky candidate, then let d be a lucky candidate such that the surplus of c relative to d is minimum, and add surplus(c, d) unregistered voters who prefer d to c. If there exists no lucky candidate, output "control impossible" and halt.
In the deleting voters case, we are given a set C of candidates, a distinguished candidate c, and a set V of voters with preferences over C. If C = {c}, then output "control impossible" and halt; else if c already is not a Condorcet winner in the election (C, V ), deleting no candidates accomplishes our goal, and we are done. Otherwise, find a candidate d who comes closest to c (i.e., relative to whom the surplus of c is minimum), and delete surplus(c, d) voters from V who prefer c to d. Now c and d tie, so c is dethroned. u
Theorem 4.24 Approval voting is vulnerable/certifiably-vulnerable to destructive control both by adding voters and by deleting voters.
Proof. That susceptibility holds in this case is shown by Examples 4.11 and 4.13. As before, we prove only certifiable vulnerability, since this here implies vulnerability.
In the adding voters case, we are given a set C of candidates, a distinguished candidate c, a set V of registered voters, and an additional set W of as yet unregistered voters (both V and W have preferences over C). If C = {c}, then output "control impossible" and halt. Otherwise, if c already is not the unique approval winner in the election (C, V ), adding no candidates accomplishes our goal, and we are done. Otherwise, for each candidate i = c, again define surplus(c, i) to be the number of Yes votes for c in V minus the number of Yes votes for i in V . Among all candidates j other than c (if any) such that there exist at least surplus(c,
In the deleting voters case, we are given a set C of candidates, a distinguished candidate c, and a set V of voters with preferences over C. If C = {c}, then output "control impossible" and halt. Otherwise, if c already is not the unique approval winner in the election (C, V ), deleting no candidates accomplishes our goal, and we are done. Otherwise, let d be a candidate among C − {c} for whom surplus(c,
Adding Candidates, Destructive Case, Condorcet and Approval Voting
Next, we prove that both Condorcet and approval voting are certifiably-vulnerable (and thus vulnerable) to destructive control by adding candidates.
Theorem 4.25 Both Condorcet and approval voting are vulnerable/certifiably-vulnerable to destructive control by adding candidates.
Proof. That susceptibility holds in this case is shown by Theorem 4.4. We again prove only certifiable vulnerability, since this here implies vulnerability. We are given a set C of qualified candidates and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, a set D of possible spoiler candidates, and a set V of voters with preferences (in the approval case, the "preferences" are 0-1 vectors) over C ∪ D.
For Condorcet voting, if c already is not the Condorcet winner, adding no candidates accomplishes our goal, and we are done. Otherwise, if any spoiler candidate ties or beats c, add one such candidate and halt. Otherwise, output "control impossible" and halt.
For approval voting, if c already is not the unique approval winner in the election (C, V ), adding no candidates accomplishes our goal, and we are done. Otherwise, if there exists a spoiler candidate d who ties or beats c among the voters in V in Yes votes, add one such spoiler candidate and halt. Otherwise, output "control impossible" and halt. Finally, we show the vulnerability results for approval voting for constructive control by deleting candidates, and by partition of candidates and run-off partition of candidates, both in model TE.
Theorem 4.26 Approval voting is vulnerable/certifiably-vulnerable to constructive control by deleting candidates, partition of candidates in model TE, and run-off partition of candidates in model TE.
Proof. That susceptibility holds in this case is shown by Theorem 4.4 and Example 4.14.
As in the previous proofs, we only show certifiable vulnerability, which again implies vulnerability. Thus, no "k" is specified in the control problem corresponding to the deleting candidates case, and in all three cases we are given a set C of candidates, a distinguished candidate c, and a set V of registered voters. We now describe a polynomial-time algorithm for each of the three constructive control problems considered.
In the deleting candidates case, if c already is the unique approval winner in the election (C, V ), deleting no candidates accomplishes our goal, and we are done. Otherwise, delete every candidate other than c who has at least as many Yes votes as c has in V and halt.
In the partition of candidates case, if c already is the unique approval winner, then output (∅, C) as a successful partition and halt. Otherwise, for each candidate a ∈ C, let y a denote the number of Yes votes cast for a in V , and let Y = max{y a | a ∈ C}. Now, if there exists exactly one a ∈ C − {c} such that y a = Y , then output "control impossible" and halt, since c cannot be made the unique winner in this case. On the other hand, if there exist at least two distinct candidates in C − {c} whose number of Yes votes is Y , then output (C 1 , C 2 ) with C 1 = C − {c} and C 2 = {c} as a successful partition and halt. This works, since in subelection (C 1 , V ) all candidates are eliminated.
Note that the same algorithm also works for the run-off partition of candidates case in model TE. u
Proving Resistance
The resistance results are based on clear containments in NP, plus (polynomial-time many-one) reductions establishing NP-hardness.
The following lemma says that for the voting systems considered here (though that may be different in general), whenever the corresponding control problem is NP-hard, immunity cannot hold unless P = NP. Proof. Consider any voting system for which winner-testing ("Is c a winner?") can be done in polynomial time. Suppose that the decision problem associated with any one of the control scenarios defined in Section 3 is NP-hard. Then, as mentioned in Footnote 4, if immunity were to hold, the associated decision problem would be in P, which would imply P = NP. u However, proving immunity and susceptibility under assumptions regarding P-versus-NP is obviously less attractive than proving immunity and susceptibility unconditionally. In particular, the ideal first step toward proving resistance results is to prove, via theorems or examples, susceptibility to the corresponding types of control. We have done that in Section 4.1, and will invoke items from that section here.
Plurality Voting
We whenever possible try to achieve multiple resistance results via a single proof. For example, with a single proof we establish the key part of all seven resistance results for plurality voting: destructive control by adding, deleting, partition (TE and TP), and run-off partition (TE and TP) of candidates, 10 and by partition of voters (TP). We now provide this proof, which is achieved via one general construction that yields the reductions, each from the NP-complete problem Hitting Set, see Garey and Johnson [GJ79] .
Hitting Set
Given: A set B = {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b m }, a family S = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n } of subsets S i of B, and a positive integer k.
Question: Does S have a hitting set of size at most k? That is, is there a set B ′ ⊆ B with ||B ′ || ≤ k such that for each i, S i ∩ B ′ = ∅?
We now present our general construction for the destructive control problems related to plurality voting.
Construction 4.28 (Construction of an Election from a Hitting Set Instance)
Given a triple (B, S, k), where B = {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b m } is a set, S = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n } is a family of subsets S i of B, and k ≤ m is a positive integer, we construct the following election:
• The candidate set is C = B ∪ {c, w}.
• The voter set V is defined as follows: We now show that the election (C, V ) constructed above has some useful properties needed to establish resistance to destructive control for plurality voting in the seven settings mentioned. Proof. Let B ′ be a hitting set of S of size k. Partition C into C 1 = B ′ ∪ {c, w} and C 2 = B − B ′ . By Claim 4.29, w is the unique plurality winner of (C 1 , V ), and c thus cannot win the election (C, V ).
For the converse, suppose that there exists a partition of candidates such that c is not the unique plurality winner of the two-stage election corresponding to that partition. Then, certainly, there exists a set D ⊆ B ∪ {w} such that c is not the unique plurality winner of (D ∪ {c}, V ). By Claim 4.30, S has a hitting set of size at most k. u
So from this and Example 4.15 we have the following.
Corollary 4.36 Plurality voting is resistant to destructive control by partition of candidates (both in model TE and TP).
The same argument works for proving that plurality voting is resistant to destructive control by run-off partition of candidates, again by a reduction from Hitting Set. Proof. Let B ′ be a hitting set of S of size k. Partition C into C 1 = B ′ ∪ {c, w} and C 2 = B − B ′ . By Claim 4.29, w is the unique plurality winner of (C 1 , V ), and c thus cannot win the election (C, V ).
For the converse, suppose that there exists a partition of candidates such that c is not the unique plurality winner in the run-off election corresponding to that partition. Then, certainly, there exists a set D ⊆ B ∪ {w} such that c is not the unique plurality winner of (D ∪ {c}, V ). By Claim 4.30, S has a hitting set of size at most k. u
Corollary 4.38 Plurality voting is resistant to destructive control by run-off partition of candidates (both in model TE and TP).
Finally, we show that plurality voting is resistant to both constructive and destructive control by partition of voters in the TP model. To this end, we reduce from the Hitting Set problem restricted to instances where n(k + 1) + 1 ≤ m − k. We first define this restriction and prove that it still is NP-complete.
Restricted Hitting Set
Given: A set B = {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b m }, a family S = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n } of subsets S i of B, and a positive integer k such that n(k + 1) + 1 ≤ m − k.
Theorem 4.39 Restricted Hitting Set is NP-complete.
Proof. Restricted Hitting Set clearly is in NP. To show that it is NP-hard, we reduce Hitting Set to Restricted Hitting Set. Let ( B, S, k) be a Hitting Set instance, where
Define an instance of Restricted Hitting Set (B, S, k), where
It is immediate that S has a hitting set of size k if and only if S has a hitting set of size k.
i.e., n(k + 1) + 1 ≤ m − k. u Claim 4.40 In the election (C, V ) from Construction 4.28, if n(k + 1) + 1 ≤ m − k then for every partition of V into V 1 and V 2 , c is a plurality winner of (C, V 1 ) or of (C, V 2 ).
Proof. For a contradiction, suppose that c is a winner of neither (C, V 1 ) nor (C, V 2 ). For each U ⊆ V and for each i ∈ C, let score U (i) denote the number of first-place votes that i has in (C, U ). Let x ∈ B ∪ {w} be a winner of (C, V 1 ), and let y ∈ B ∪ {w} be a winner of (C, V 2 ). Then
Since c's score in (C, V ) is greater than that of any other candidate, we have x = y. It follows that
which contradicts Equation (4.8). Thus, c is a winner of (C, V 1 ) or of (C, V 2 ). u
We now show that Construction 4.28 also provides a reduction from Restricted Hitting Set both to Constructive Control by Partition of Voters and to Destructive Control by Partition of Voters in the Ties-Promote model for plurality voting.
• The candidate set is C = B ∪ {w}, where w is the distinguished candidate.
• V consists of k − 2 registered voters who each approve of b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b m and disapprove of w.
• W consists of n unregistered voters: For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter in W who approves of w and the three candidates in S i , and who disapproves of all other candidates.
We claim that S contains an exact cover for B if and only if w can be made the unique approval winner by adding at most k voters.
For the left to right direction, simply add the k voters from W that correspond to the exact cover for B. Then w has k Yes votes and every b ∈ B has (k − 2) + 1 = k − 1 Yes votes, so w is the unique approval winner.
For the right to left direction, suppose that w can be made the unique approval winner by adding at most k voters. Then we clearly need to add exactly k voters and every b ∈ B can gain at most one Yes vote. Since each voter in W casts three Yes votes for candidates in B, it follows that every b ∈ B gains exactly one Yes vote. Thus, the k added voters correspond to an exact cover for B. u Proof. That susceptibility holds in this case is shown by Example 4.13.
Let an instance (B, S) of X3C be given, where
Construct the following election:
• The voter set V consists of the following voters:
-For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter in V who approves of all candidates in S i and who disapproves of all other candidates.
-There are n voters v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n in V such that, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, v i approves of w, and v i approves of b j if and only if i ≤ n − ℓ j .
Note that the election (C, V ) has the property that all candidates have n Yes votes. We claim that S contains an exact cover for B if and only if w can be made the unique approval winner by deleting at most k voters.
For the left to right direction, simply delete the k voters from V that correspond to an exact cover for B. Then every b ∈ B loses one Yes vote, leaving w the unique approval winner.
For the right to left direction, suppose that w can be made the unique approval winner by deleting at most k voters. Without loss of generality, we may assume that none of the deleted voters approves of w. So, we assume that only voters corresponding to S i 's have been deleted. For w to have become the unique winner, every b ∈ B must have lost at least one Yes vote. It follows that the deleted voters correspond to a cover, and since the cover has size at most k, this must be an exact cover for B.
u Proof. That susceptibility holds in this case is shown by Example 4.17. Let an instance (B, S) of X3C be given, where B = {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b m }, m = 3k, k > 0, S = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n }, and S i ⊆ B with ||S i || = 3 for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We modify the construction from the proof of Theorem 4.44. As in that proof, for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, let ℓ j = ||{S i ∈ S | b j ∈ S i }||. Now, define the following election:
• The candidate set is C = B ∪ {w, x, y}, where w is the distinguished candidate.
-For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter in V who approves of y and of all elements of S i and who disapproves of all other candidates.
-There are n voters v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n in V such that, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, v i approves of w, v i disapproves of x, v i disapproves of y, and v i approves of b j if and only if i ≤ n − ℓ j .
-There are k + 1 voters in V who approve of x and disapprove of all other candidates.
-Finally, there are k+2 voters in V who disapprove of x and approve of all other candidates.
Note that this election has the property that all candidates other than x have n + k + 2 Yes votes. We claim that S contains an exact cover for B if and only if w can be made the unique approval winner by partition of voters in model TP.
For the left to right direction, if S contains an exact cover for B, then let V 2 consist of the k voters corresponding to the sets in the cover and of all the k + 1 voters who approve of only x, and let V 1 = V − V 2 . Then
• w is the unique approval winner of (C, V 1 ),
• x is the unique approval winner of (C, V 2 ), and
• w wins the run-off against x.
For the right to left direction, suppose that w can be made the unique approval winner by partition of voters in model TP. Since w is the unique winner in the run-off, and since every candidate other than x is tied with w (each having n + k + 2 Yes votes in V ), the only candidates that can participate in the run-off are w and x. Since we are in the TP model, w must be the unique winner of one of the subelections and x must be the unique winner of the other subelection.
Let (V 1 , V 2 ) be a partition of V such that w is the unique winner of (C, V 1 ) and such that x is the unique winner of (C, V 2 ). As in the proof of Theorem 4.44, it follows that the voters corresponding to S i 's that are not in V 1 (i.e., that are in V 2 ) correspond to a cover. Since x is the unique winner of (C, V 2 ) and x has k + 1 Yes votes, y can have at most k Yes votes in V 2 . It follows that there are at most k voters corresponding to S i 's in V 2 . Thus, there are exactly k such voters, and these voters correspond to an exact cover. u
Note that the previous construction won't work for the TE model, since in that model, w also wins the election if two or more candidates are tied for first place in V 2 . In the proof of the next theorem, we will adapt the construction from the proof of Theorem 4.45.
Theorem 4.46 Approval voting is resistant to constructive control by partition of voters in model TE.
Proof. That susceptibility holds in this case is shown by Example 4.17.
Let an instance (B, S) of X3C be given, where B = {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b m }, m = 3k, k > 0, S = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n }, and S i ⊆ B with ||S i || = 3 for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We modify the construction from the proof of Theorem 4.45. As in that proof, for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, let ℓ j = ||{S i ∈ S | b j ∈ S i }||. Now, define the following election:
• The candidate set is C = B ∪ {w, x, y} ∪ {z 1 , . . . , z n }, where w is the distinguished candidate.
-For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one voter in V who approves of y and z i and who disapproves of all other candidates.
-There are n voters v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n in V such that, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, v i approves of w, v i disapproves of x, v i disapproves of y, v i approves of b j if and only if i ≤ n − ℓ j , and v i approves of z j if and only if i = n.
-There are n + k voters in V who approve of x and who disapprove of all other candidates.
Note that this election has the property that all candidates other than x and y have n Yes votes. We claim that S contains an exact cover for B if and only if w can be made the unique approval winner by partition of voters in model TE.
For the left to right direction, if S contains an exact cover for B, then let V 2 consist of the k voters corresponding to the sets in the cover and of all the n + k voters who approve of only x and for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, of the voter who approves of only y and z i . Let V 1 = V − V 2 . Then w is the unique approval winner of (C, V 1 ), and x and y are tied for first place in (C, V 2 ) with n + k Yes votes each. Since we are in model TE, no candidates are nominated by (C, V 2 ), and w wins the run-off (and thus the election) by default.
For the right to left direction, suppose that w can be made the unique approval winner by partition of voters in model TE. Since we are in model TE, w must be the unique winner of one of the subelections. Let (V 1 , V 2 ) be a partition of V such that w is the unique winner of (C, V 1 ). As in the proof of Theorem 4.44, it follows that the voters corresponding to S i 's that are not in V 1 (i.e., that are in V 2 ) correspond to a cover.
Suppose that there are more than k voters that correspond to S i 's in V 2 . Note that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the voter that approves of only y and z i must also be in V 2 (for if it weren't, z i would have at least as many Yes votes in V 1 as w). It follows that y has more than n + k Yes votes in V 2 . But then y is the unique approval winner in V 2 , since no other candidate has more than n + k Yes votes in V . Since y beats w in the run-off, this contradicts the fact that w wins the election. It follows that there are at most k voters corresponding to S i 's in V 2 . Thus, there are exactly k such voters, and these voters correspond to an exact cover. u
Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the computational resistance and vulnerability of three voting systemsplurality, Condorcet, and approval voting-to destructive control by an election's chair in each of seven control scenarios: candidate addition, suppression, partition, and run-off partition, and voter addition, suppression, and partition. We classified each case as immune, vulnerable, or computationally resistant. We also studied the analogous constructive control cases and fully resolved those that were not considered by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] .
We identified cases where a system immune to constructive control still can be vulnerable to destructive control (e.g., Condorcet voting for control by adding candidates), and vice versa (e.g., approval voting for control by deleting candidates). We saw that, among the systems studied, none is globally superior to the others. Rather, when choosing a voting system, one's choice will depend on the types of control against which protection is most desired. Finally, we saw that-in contrast to some comments in earlier papers-tie-breaking is a far from minor issue: For those control types that involve partitions of the candidate or voter set, we studied two natural tie-handling rules, and we found specific cases in which the complexity of the corresponding control problem varies crucially depending on which tie-handling rule is adopted.
